From: Dave Ball (vought@msn.com)
Date: Sun Jan 12 2003 - 23:26:50 PST
Convoy suggestions when two black hawks are down.....
Never put the weakest vehicles in front always the fastest and best equipped
and heaviest armed in case of trouble.
SITUATION: A company-sized convoy of light infantry, mounted on High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
(HMMWVs), moves along a city street. U.S. forces are deployed in a flat,
hot, dry, famine-stricken country as part of a multinational coalition
force. The mission of the coalition is to provide a secure environment for
the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. Armed bands have been
frustrating these efforts for months, and about one hour ago, U.S. Special
Operations Forces conducted a raid to seize two lieutenants of the most
powerful local bandit. During the raid, two UH-60 helicopters were shot down
by bandits armed with RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenades. About 90 U.S.
soldiers are pinned-down at the first crash site by hundreds of bandits
armed with AK-47 assault rifles and RPG-7s. At least two Americans are dead,
and more than twenty are injured. Casualties among the bandits are much
higher. The mission of the company is to reach the pinned-down soldiers at
the crash site, reinforce them, and help evacuate all forces and wounded to
a secure area. When the company left its position at a nearby airfield ten
minutes ago, the standing RAMP rules were in effect, but five minutes ago
several vehicles in the convoy were ambushed by organized bands firing
AK-47s. U.S. forces returned fire and continued. The commander has just
supplemented RAMP rules with the order to ANTICIPATE ATTACK along the route
by firing at armed local persons who appear near the road.
EVENT: As his vehicle rounds a bend, a soldier in a HMMWV near the back of
the convoy notices three men with
rifles peering at the front of the convoy from behind a wall and talking
among themselves. The men begin to raise the weapons to their shoulders.
CONSIDERATIONS: The key rule here is to ANTICIPATE ATTACK on the convoy.
Under the RAMP rules, as supplemented by the commander, soldiers can fire
their weapons before receiving fire, if they see clear indicators of hostile
intent. Here the soldier can conclude that the intentions of the three men
are hostile because of their size (small but organized, similar to ambushing
bands), activity (they are hiding behind a wall and raising their weapons),
the location (near the road being traveled by the convoy), the time factor
(only minutes after other vehicles in the quick reaction force have been
ambushed with rifle fire), and equipment (AK-47). Each of the other RAMP
rules supports the soldier's decision to fire at the men. Soldiers can
RETURN FIRE with fire, and respond to hostile acts with necessary force.
Although it is not clear that these particular men fired on the convoy
earlier, what the soldier observes is consistent with a continued attack on
the U.S. convoy. Soldiers must MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF FORCE to fit the level
of threat, if time and circumstances permit. Under these circumstances,
aimed shots at the men are the correct measure of force to protect lives and
accomplish the mission. Given the lack of time available, the soldier should
not attempt lesser measures along the graduated scale of force -- verbal
warning, etc. Finally, the soldier can fire his rifle, the only lethal
weapon available, because soldiers can PROTECT LIFE WITH DEADLY FORCE.
SUGGESTED RESPONSE: To fire at the men, and alert the remainder of the
convoy.
HISTORICAL NOTE: This problem is roughly patterned after an incident that
occurred in Somalia on 3 October 1993. Although conducting a humanitarian
assistance mission, U.S. forces found themselves in a fierce firefight with
Somali bandits. The company was part of a Quick Reaction Force ordered to
reinforce Special Operations soldiers who were pinned down in a different
part of Mogadishu. Shortly after leaving Mogadishu International Airport in
the late afternoon, the company was ambushed. Soldiers and Somalis fired
thousands of rounds of ammunition and fired hundreds of grenades before the
Americans were forced to backtrack and seek an alternative route to the
crash site.
REFERENCES: SMCT 181-906-1506; Rick Atkinson, Night of a Thousand
Casualties: Battle Triggered the United States Decision to Withdraw From
Somalia, Wash. Post, 31 Jan 94, at A1.
Convoy rules such as speed should be predetirminred and set by the lead
vehicle the lead vehicle should know the route and be in charge of the
convoy much like a scout.
He should call for halts at pre arranged intervals and stop and conduct
traffic also in the case of a break down the convoy leader should fall back
and pass the lead to a pre designated second with the same knowledge of
route and safe speed of travel most likley 45 miles an hour.
In hilly terrain heavy vehicles may proceed slower and faster vehicles at a
faster pace with a halt once flat ground is reached once the heavier
vehicles catch up they can halt and take a break and the convoy will proceed
as a unit at such time the convoy leader gives the order.
Radio equipment is a help but not needed if the leader directs the traffic
flow from a vehicle that is able to travel at a quicker pace.
If the lead vehicle is not able to do so then a tail end vehicle should be
radio equiped as well as the lead vehicle so as to control the convoy from
the front as well as the rear.
Before the convoy starts out a meeting should take place and the rules
should be told to the drivers as well as a few hand signals learned so as to
make travel more controlled a route map with halts and direction changes
clearly marked should be provided to all drivers.
Dave
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