From: Steve Grammont (islander@midmaine.com)
Date: Sun Jul 04 2004 - 09:21:23 PDT
Some comments...
>Growing up my impression was that the Guard
>was here to help with domestic problems and Possibly to relieve active
>duty forces so that those forces could go fight an action..
That is the main role of the NG, but now a days it is often more theory
than practice. However, the fine print basically states that NG can be
deployed anywhere at any time. I'm not exactly sure what the limitations
are, but judging by what has been going on for the past 2 years, there
don't appear to be many that can't be overcome by the Pentagon.
The NG has been a part of external active duty military ops for probably
as long as it has existed. Many of the initial field divisions of WWII
were mobilized NG units. I'm not sure about Vietnam, but with the draft
in place and the relatively small commitment (compared to WWII that is!)
there wasn't as much need to scrounge up personnel as there is with
today's "volunteer" army (it is much less that now than it was 2 years
ago). Yes, the 1st Gulf War saw many NG units fully mobilized and
deployed. In fact, Desert Storm was delayed in part due to inadequate
readiness levels of some of those units. Meaning, until they had a
couple more months of training they were deemed unfit for frontline duty.
Note that this isn't a criticism of the NG units, rather of starting up
a war without inadequate troops at the ready (sound familiar?).
>I have found it really odd that the NG has been sent to Iraq to fight a
>war when we have troops all over the world who ARE trained and equipped
>to do so who have not been.
It is inadvisable, from a military strategy standpoint, to take all your
1st line troops and lump them into one spot at one time. In fact it
might be the first lesson in the course "How to Avoid Military Blunders
101" :-) The US has many small, medium, and large military commitments
all over the world and can not simply pack up all active army troops and
replace them with those who are not familiar with the theater, tempo of
active duty, 1st line equipment (remember many NG units use yesterday's
Army castoffs), etc., etc. Redeployment is also very expensive.
When Congress asked how many troops were needed for a possible war with
Iraq the number given by then Secretary of the Army was deemed "nonsense"
by Rumsfeld. The reason is that number, roughly 3 to 4 times what we
have in theater now, was absolutely impractical without a reinstatement
of the draft or a large scale mobilization of NG troops. Since either
one would have caused the American people to ask harder questions about
why war was necessary, what the strategy was, and how the Powell Doctrin
was going to be satisfied, Rumsfeld simply gave the boot to those who
said it couldn't be done "on the cheap". Reality has already shown that
Rumsfeld, and his deputies, were wrong and the military professionals
were right. 130,000 troops is not enough to win the war (for it has not
ended, despite the carrier landing PR stunt saying it was) and the
military is not currently manned and resourced enough to sustain 130,000
troops in high tempo active military ops along with Afghanistan and other
static theaters.
Rumsfield, BTW, is a big supporter of small sized military forces. That
theory works fine with a minimal active military agenda, but it
completely falls apart when faced with wars in two vast countries with
hostile populations at the same time. In the words of a LT COL friend of
mine at the Pentagon, "I can't believe how bad we are $*&%ing this up".
>I know this is off topic, and apologize for it, but I've been wondering
>about this since we went back into Iraq. And this list tracks military
>matters closely. I have not seen anything about this in the press or on
>the radio. I know our forces were down sized tremendously but why are NG
>troops being killed when we have active duty troops available all around
>the world? And to get home and be 're-deployed'...
The standard deployment rotations were well thought out in terms of
logistics, morale, and expense. The failure of the initial Iraq war
"plan" (if it can be called that) has necessitated that these very well
founded principles be chucked out the window. I say failure of the Iraq
war plan because we were supposed to have pretty much no troops in Iraq
at this point and a passive, friendly populace. In reality, the force
needs to be at least double its current size, if not triple as the Army's
initial estimates called for.
Solutions? Withdraw from Iraq in military failure (not an option!), drop
the "my way or the highway" attitude so allies will cough up large
numbers of troops so we don't have to, institute a limited draft, large
scale mobilization of the NG (which is, in a sense, a draft), or back out
of long standing security commitments in other parts of the world so the
resources there can be redeployed to the ME. Yup, none of these options
are all that good, but that is what happens when politicians try to run
wars instead of the military professionals.
Steve
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