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>Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2001 19:42:28 -0500 (CDT)
>From: <alert@stratfor.com>
>To: redalert@stratfor.com
>Subject: Global Intelligence Cooperation
>
>___________________________________________________________________
>
>
> S T R A T F O R
>
> THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY
>
> http://www.stratfor.com
>___________________________________________________________________
>
> 13 September 2001
>
>COMPLIMENTARY INTELLIGENCE REPORT - FULL TEXT
>___________________________________________________________________
>
>**NOTE**
>
>This is a complimentary full-text intelligence report, normally
>reserved for members only. For full-text reports every day and access
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>http://www.stratfor.com/COMPANY/info
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>Global Intelligence Cooperation Comes With Risks
>
>2355 GMT, 010913
>
>Summary
>
>The United States is now building coalition support for its
>response to Sept. 11 terror attacks. The chief benefit of
>cooperation with the international community will be
>intelligence. The ease with which the terrorists struck
>demonstrates a gaping hole in U.S. intelligence capabilities that
>allies may help to fill. A host of nations have jumped at the
>chance to build cooperation with the United States, but such
>collaboration comes with a price.
>
>Analysis
>
>U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said Sept. 13 that the
>United States would seek to build a coalition response to terror
>attacks in Washington, D.C., and New York City. A host of
>countries -- including China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and
>Saudi Arabia -- have offered to help the United States track down
>those responsible.
>
>The offers come when the United States has dire need for
>intelligence on the activities, operations, networks and funding
>of foreign terrorist organizations based in Africa, the Middle
>East and central and southeast Asia. But global counterterrorism
>cooperation among a group of nations could be a catch-22 for the
>United States. Other nations will seek to shape the United
>States' coming war against terrorism to suit their own interests.
>
>For Washington, this presents a strategic dilemma. Cooperation is
>necessary and invaluable, but the benefits must be weighed
>against the motivations of the many actors involved. This will
>hamper counterterrorism efforts. The United States is also
>inclined to act unilaterally. Dependence upon foreign sources for
>intelligence would make this impossible. But the United States
>cannot decline all foreign support. The radical Islamic groups
>most likely involved -- although organized into a loose network -
>- act in concert. Fighting them will require cooperation.
>
>Washington needs the intelligence capabilities of other nations.
>For example, India, Israel and Russia can provide significant
>human intelligence sources and foreign language skills. Both are
>vital to exposing the terrorist network involved in the recent
>attacks. Other nations can also provide intelligence on terrorism
>networks within their own countries, as well as the groups'
>sources of funding, likely sponsors, and intelligence-gathering
>and other capabilities.
>
>Many of these nations have a wealth of information on
>counterterrorism methodology and decades of experience fighting
>militant groups. These countries and others -- especially
>cooperative moderate Arab nations -- can help U.S. intelligence
>officials penetrate countries where spying is normally difficult.
>
> >From a logistical and technical perspective, such cooperation
>could give Washington a competitive advantage for a war in which
>intelligence will be the most valuable weapon.
>
>But accepting such assistance comes with a price. The trap is
>simple: By pinpointing groups like Palestinians and Chechens,
>nations such as Israel and Russia could seek to manipulate the
>U.S. response in order to combat their own enemies.
>
>Israel immediately offered intelligence and military assistance
>to the United States following the Sept. 11 attacks. Israel is
>eager for the United States to identify a common enemy and to
>gain U.S. support in its own problem with Palestinian militants.
>Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, in conversations with U.S. Secretary
>of State Colin Powell, compared Palestinian Authority leader
>Yasser Arafat to Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden -- the United
>States' prime suspect, Israeli radio reported Sept. 13.
>
>Collaborating with Israel could put the United States in a
>difficult position. Already, the attacks in the United States
>have granted Israel virtual carte blanche in dealing with
>suspected Palestinian militants. Sharing intelligence about
>insurgent groups in the Middle East with Washington will once
>again position Israel as an indispensable U.S. ally, ensuring
>continued support in its war against the Palestinians and
>possibly future conflicts with Arab neighbors.
>
>Many other nations could benefit in the same way. For example,
>India has already offered to help the United States if
>investigators link the Sept. 11 attacks to bin Laden and his
>operations in Pakistan, the Times of India reported Sept. 13.
>India would gladly use U.S. resources to stamp out radical
>Islamic groups in Pakistan as these groups are fighting in
>Kashmir, territory over which India and Pakistan have fought
>three wars.
>
>Similarly, Russia stands to gain from helping America. The
>Russian Federal Security Service has already identified the
>Pakistan-based radical Islamic group Jaamat e-Islami as the
>likely suspect in the suicide hijackings. The group has been tied
>to Chechen rebels and a spate of bombings in Russia in 1999,
>according to ITAR-TASS. Moscow has its own reasons, however, to
>finger a group connected to the Chechens and targeted by India:
>By condemning these groups, the United States will be forced to
>drop its own criticism of Russia's operations in Chechnya.
>
>Other countries can use a global intelligence coalition to their
>own benefit. Even if they are not directly threatened by Islamic
>fundamentalist groups, by sharing intelligence and collaborating
>with the United States in a global war against terrorism, they
>would have a plethora of opportunities to gather intelligence on
>potential rivals or stretch their own military reach.
>
>For instance, the head of the Japanese Defense Agency announced
>Sept. 11 that Japan would fully support the United States and act
>with it to deal with terrorist attacks, The Associated Press
>reported. If Japan can frame its military restructuring as an
>international counterterrorism effort, that would go a long way
>to help Tokyo avoid many problems associated with the legacy of
>its World War II militarism and with domestic and foreign
>opposition.
>
>European countries will seek to strengthen their own
>counterterrorism measures and benefit from American financial
>resources. Though Spain, for instance, is not likely to claim
>that Basque separatists were involved in the World Trade Center
>and Pentagon attacks, cooperation with the United States can
>advance Madrid's efforts to end its problem with separatist
>rebels.
>
>People the world over see the attack on the United States as a
>tragedy. But foreign governments will look to turn it into an
>opportunity to solve many of their own national security
>problems. The United States will accept help to a limited degree
>although ultimately it is more likely to implement policy on a
>unilateral basis. But with a united enemy, a disunited coalition
>puts the United States at a disadvantage not easily overcome.
>
>__________________________________________________________________
>
>
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