From: Steve Grammont (islander@midmaine.com)
Date: Thu Dec 09 2004 - 20:55:35 PST
Kent,
>Look, Steve, could you give Cliff a bit of a break here.
I was up until the point he called me a traitor. I'm sorry Kent, but
that kind of talk is inexcusable and should not be tolerated. Life over
there is certainly not pleasant for most, but if it is so rough that our
soldiers are forgetting why they are over there in the first place...
we've already lost.
>While I can't speak for Cliff, I'm sure he's currently lacking some of
>his favorite [insert your favorite here]. So, to say that he is
>slightly out of his element or routine is an understatement. I'll bet
>he's a bit more testy and aggressive right now than normal. Hell, Cliff
>might be living in a world of sh*t right now...and I forgive him.
If he emails me and says something similar, and apologizes, I'd forgive
him too. People sometimes say things that they regret later, but if they
don't regret it... no forgiveness should be offered. I don't ask that
Cliff agree with me, just agree that I am entitled to disagree.
>On an MV note, what was the intention of the M998 anyway? Was it not a
>replacement for the Jeep models? The 151's were not armored. It was,
>as one put it, never designed to be armored. Where did this concern
>originate? All you hear is armor this, and armor that.
Check out Gene's most recent post. They were designed to be a multi-
purpose platform for a variety of roles. It was supposed to be able to
go anywhere under any conditions, doing whatever could be thunk up for
them to do (including being a platform for LOSAT). The one thing it was
not designed to do, which is what Gene was dead on about, was to be put
in the position of prime target of the enemy.
In the old Cold War military thinking the rear units were supposed to be
able to keep to the rear. If the "Reds" invaded we would simply pull
them back covered by armor, artillery, and air assets. If we invaded
them, we could move them forward after the way was made clear by the
armor, artillery, and air assets. In either case the risk to the rear
units would be minimal. For simplicity sake I am including HQ and
immediate support logistic functions as "rear", though they generally are not.
Unfortunately, the Pentagon has not come up with the force structure and
equipment that is suited for prolonged, asystemic warfare of the type we
are seeing in Iraq and, to a much lesser extent lately, Afghanistan.
This is not to blame the Pentagon. It has been changing over the past 15
some odd years to be better suited for this type of mission, but these
kinds of fundamental shifts take time and (unfortunately) some hard
lessons in the process. Our forces in Iraq are much better suited to
fulfilling their task than the forces of Gulf Storm were because of the
changes done so far. But obviously there are still major things that
need to be figured out. The safety of logistics is a big part of that.
The whole problem comes down to designing our military to be more of an
occupation (i.e. police) force. If the military is to perform this role
then it should be outfitted and trained to function in that role. But if
the military is to remain a more pure military force, then some other
kind of organization needs to be created to fill the occupation role or a
compromise developed. The latter is what is being worked out in real
time on the battlefields of Iraq.
It is a big topic and one that will probably take another decade to get
straight. But I have faith that we will get it right. Hopefully before
the next time the need arises.
Steve
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